Indicators of corruption: further explorations of the link between corruption and implementation failure in anti-trafficking policies

Jan Van Dijk[1] & Fanny Klerx-Van Mierlo[2]

Abstract: We present key results of the EU ICS and ICVS 2005 concerning victimisation by bribe- seeking from public officials. Next we present findings of secondary analyses of the ICVS- based measure of corruption. The results show that country rates for corruption are only weakly related to victimisation by ordinary crime. They also show that the ICVS rates of actual experiences with bribe- seeking are moderately strongly related to perception- based corruption measures such as the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International and the Control of Corruption Index of the World Bank Institute.

We have reviewed previous criminometric analyses of the impact of corruption on the execution of global policies against human trafficking. In this context we have replicated previous analyses using different quantitative measures of both corruption and anti-trafficking policies. In line with the results of Zhang & Pineda (2008) and Seo-Young Cho, Dreher & Neumayer (2011), we found statistically significant inverse correlations between the ICVS – based indicator of corruption and two perception –based corruption indicators of the World Bank and TI respectively, and two measures of implementation failure, the ratings in the Trafficking in Persons Reports by the US State Department and a composite index of compliance with international standards for anti-trafficking policies constructed by Seo-

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Young Cho, Dreher & Neumayer. The results confirm the link between corruption among public officials and failures in the overall implementation of anti-trafficking policies. Surprisingly, the statistical relationships were weaker with a constituent measure of prosecution than with constituent measures of prevention and victim protection. Some suggestions are made for an improved measure of prosecution performance that could be used in future analyses.

Keywords: corruption, human trafficking, statistical indicators.

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Introduction

The original questionnaire of the ICVS designed in 1987 was, as most national victimisation surveys at the time, exclusively focussed on victimisations by common crime (Van Dijk, Mayhew & Killias, 1990). In the second round of the ICVS, conducted in 1992, the survey was for the first time carried out in a broad selection of developing countries and former communist countries with economies in transition. It was decided that a survey on experiences of crime in these countries should not just address victimisations by conventional crime but also the public's experiences with bribe-taking by public officials. The new additional item was formulated as follows:

> "*In some countries, there is a problem of corruption among government or public officials. During 1995, has any government official, for instance a customs officer, a police officer, or inspector in your country asked you, or expected you to pay a bribe for his services?*".[3]

In the round of 1992 the item was included only in the version of the questionnaire used for face to face interviewing in developing countries and countries in transition (Zvekics & Alvazzi del Frate, 1995). In the third round of the ICVS, the item was adopted in the standard questionnaire used in developed countries as well. With the incorporation of the item on bribery by public officials, the

[3] . The item on corruption was not integrated in the regular set of questions on victimisation using five year and one year reference periods. In the EU Safety Survey to be conducted in 2013, the item on corruption has for the first time been fully integrated in the list of items on victimisation experiences (Van Dijk et al., 2010).

ICVS has considerably broadened its scope. Its results can be used not only to estimate the burden posed by ordinary problems of crime on citizens in a comparative perspective but they also yield a comparative indicator of the integrity of state officials.

In later years several new surveys have been designed by the World Bank and Transparency International which measure various aspects of good governance or the rule of law, including the (perceived) prevalence of corrupt practices. The rankings of countries on these measures have played a significant role in raising awareness of national problems of corruption. In this contribution we will explore how the ICVS-based indicator of bribe-seeking relates to these other, more comprehensive or detailed measures of corruption. Both types of indices will be shown to be fairly strongly correlated with each other. Both types of indicators seem to have their own merits and limitations. From a scientific perspective the ranking of countries on the basis of indicators of corruption is obviously not a goal by itself. The real test of quantitative indicators of corruption is whether they can be used for criminometric analyses. In the second part of the paper we will explore whether and how different quantitative indicators of corruption such as the victimisation-based and perceptions-based indicator of corruption can be used to analyse the impact of bad governance on the efficicay of anti-crime policies.More specifically, we will explore whether quantitative indicators of corruption can be successfully used to study the supposedly negative impact of corruption on the fight against human trafficking.

The item on bribe-seeking in the ICVS

Corruption can be broadly defined as the abuse of public power for private gain. A distinction is often made between ‘grand corruption’ and ‘petty’ or ‘street level corruption’. Grand corruption refers to corrupt practices that pervade the highest levels of government. Petty corruption involves the payment by individuals or companies of relatively small sums to gain preferential treatment from a public official in the conduct of their professional tasks. One of the most common forms of corruption is bribery, the bestowing of (financial) benefits in order to unduly influence an action or decision. A further distinction can be made between active and passive bribery. Active bribery refers to the offering or payment of bribes and passive bribery to the seeking or receiving of bribes. The ICVS item

asks about experiences of respondents with street level bribery of public officials in the course of last year (passive corruption).

The 1996 ICVS round showed that in Western countries this type of corruption was uncommon. The rates in all countries were below 1% (Mayhew & van Dijk, 1997). On average 17.6% of people in the developing world reported incidents involving corruption, and 12.8% in countries in transitions (Zvekic, 1998).

In the ICVS rounds of 2000 and 2005, the item on bribery experiences was retained. Table 1 shows results of the ICVS 2005/ EU ICS, conducted in 30 countries and some older data of national surveys where available[4].

[4] In this article we have not limited ourselves to the data of the EU ICS 2005. Member States of the EU show little variation in the prevalence of low level bribe-seeking. We did not want to restrict our analysis of relationships between corruption and implementation failure in anti-trafficing policies to a selection of EU Member States where the prevalence of corruption is comparatively low.

Table 1: Experiences with bribe-seeking by public officials; one year prevalence rates (percentages) in countries and main cities and results from earlier national surveys. 1996 - 2005 ICVS

	1996 surveys	2000 surveys	2004/05 surveys			2001/05 surveys	
Greece			13.5	*	Maputo (Mozambique)	30.5	
Mexico			13.3		Phnom Phen (Cambodia)	29.0	
Bulgaria			8.4		Greater Johannesburg (RSA)	15.5	
Hungary			4.9	*	Athens (Greece)	13.8	*
Poland	4.8	5.1	4.4		Lima (Peru)	13.7	
Georgia	21.9	16.8	3.5		Istanbul (Turkey)	7.1	
Estonia	3.8	5.2	3.1				
France	0.7	1.3	1.1	*	Budapest (Hungary)	6.9	*
Portugal		1.4	1.0	*	Buenos Aires (Argentina)	5.8	
Denmark		0.3	1.0	*	Tallinn (Estonia)	3.7	
Austria	0.7		0.6	*	Brussels (Belgium)	1.2	*
Canada	0.4	0.4	0.6		Lisbon (Portugal)	1.1	*
Germany			0.6	*	Rome (Italy)	0.9	*
USA	0.3	0.2	0.5		Paris (France)	0.8	*
Belgium		0.3	0.5	*	London (England)	0.7	*
New Zealand			0.5		Vienna (Austria)	0.7	*
Norway			0.4		Edinborough (Scotland)	0.5	
Scotland	0.3	0.0	0.4		Berlin (Germany)	0.5	*
Luxembourg			0.4	*	Stockholm (Sweden)	0.5	*
Italy			0.4	*	Copenhagen (Denmark)	0.4	*
Australia		0.3			Reykjavic (Iceland)	0.4	
Ireland			0.3	*	Madrid (Spain)	0.4	*
Spain			0.3	*	New York (USA)	0.4	
Iceland			0.3		Amsterdam (Netherlands)	0.2	*
Japan		0.0	0.2		Oslo (Norway)	0.2	
Switzerland	0.2				Helsinki (Finland)	0.1	*
Netherlands	0.5	0.4	0.2	*	Dublin (Ireland)	0.1	*
Sweden	0.2	0.1	0.1	*	Hong Kong (SAR Hong	0.0	
England & Wales	0.3	0.1	0.0	*	Belfast (Northern Ireland)	0.0	
Finland	0.1	0.2	0.0				
Northern Ireland	0.0	0.2	0.0				
Average			2.0		Average	4.8	

* The Burden of Crime in the EU, A comparative Analysis of the European Survey of Crime and Safety (EUICS 2005). Gallup-Europe, Brussels

In 2005 on average 2% of the public in the 30 participating countries reported any incident of bribe-seeking, with most countries showing rates below 0.5%. Greece and Mexico stood out with percentages as high as of 13.5 and 13.3. As had been the case in the previous sweeps, corruption was also high in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Georgia, Hungary and Estonia. Rates in Denmark, France and Portugal are relatively low, yet higher than in many other Western European countries. Results of the previous two sweeps also showed relatively high rates in France and Portugal. Within Western Europe, Northern countries show lower scores than Mediterranean countries.

For countries participating in the 1996, 2000 and 2005 rounds of the ICVS, trend data on bribe seeking are available. The modest sample sizes of 2000 per country and the low level of victimisation by this type of crime, limit the possibility to draw conclusions. In 1996 transitional countries and especially Georgia stood out with the highest rates in Europe (see also Zvekics, 1998). In Estonia, Georgia and Poland the level of corruption remained comparatively high between 1996 and 2000. It dropped significantly thereafter. The drop in Georgia is confirmed by results of ICVS-based surveys in 2010 and 2011 (Van Dijk, 2011). In 2010 and 2011 only 0.2 % of the population mentioned that one or more officials had asked them to pay a bribe in the course of last year. The Georgian results point at a dramatic drop in bribe-seeking since 2000.

In Bulgaria, the ICVS was supplemented by a series of dedicated surveys on experiences and perceptions of bribe-seeking, whereby an ICVS-type of item was used (Stoyanov, 2000; Coalition 2000, 2005). These surveys reveal a significant downward trend between 1999 and 2005. Taken together, the results of Bulgaria, Estonia, Georgia and Poland suggest that the transition from autocratic, communist regimes to market economies and democratic institutions has had a delayed positive impact on the level of bribe-seeking. In some countries however the transition seems initially to have been accompanied by a spike in corrupt practices.

In the ICVS 2005 additional samples were drawn from the capital cities. This oversampling allows for direct comparisons with results of ICVS surveys in capitals of developing countries. Results are given in the second column of figure 1. At the city level, rates were very high in Maputo (30.5%) and Pnom

Phen (29%). Rates significantly above the mean were also found in Johannesburg (15,5%), Athens (13.8%), Lima (13.7%), Istanbul (7,1%) and Budapest (6.9%).

In a follow up question, respondents were asked which categories of officials had asked for bribes. The results show that across the world police officers were the category of officials most often mentioned as receivers or seekers of bribes, followed by government officials, custom officers and inspectors. Only very few victims reported the incident to the police or any other official authority. Compared to the conventional crimes included in the ICVS, corruption is by far the crime category with the highest amount of 'dark numbers'.

Analyses of the relationships between the victimisation rates for different types of crime such as burglaries, robberies or car thefts across countries, have shown that these types of victimisation are strongly intercorrelated (Van Dijk, Nevala, 2002). Correlations coefficients between the rates of victimisation by any of ten crimes and victimisation by specific types of crime are in the range from .30 to .80. The best predictor of the over all victimisation rate was victimisation by burglary (r= + .82). If victimisation by one type of conventional crime is relatively high in a country, this is usually true for other types of criminality as well. Victimisation by corruption tends to show a different distribution than ordinary crime. As shown above, victimisation by bribe seeking is much more common among poorer countries. This is not necessarily the case with victimisation by common crime. Elsewhere we have shown that measures of non-conventional crime including corrutption and the ICVS rates of victimisation by crime are unrelated (Van Dijk, Nevala, 2002). We have revisited the relationship between corruption and ordinary crime using the results of the ICVS 1996/2000. Figure 1 shows results.

Figure 1 Rates of victimisation by bribe seeking and rates of victimisation by any of ten types of common crime; results of the ICVS 1996/2000.



The results of the ICVS 2000 confirm that levels of street level corruption are only weakly related to levels of common crime at the macro level. The ICVS item on experiences with bribe seeking captures another dimension of the total crime problems of countries than victimisation by property crime or violence.

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The ICVS results on corruption victimisation have been used by Transparency International as source variable of older versions of its Corruption Perception Index. In 2003, Transparency International contracted Gallup to conduct a public opinion survey in 64 countries among a total of 50,000 people to assess both perceptions of corruption and victimisation experiences (Global Corruption Barometer, TI, 2004). The question used to measure actual victimization experiences reads: '*In the past 12 months, have you or anyone in your household paid a bribe in any form'*. The question resembles the one used in the ICVS but asks about the actual payment of bribes rather than on solicitation *('were you asked or expected to pay'*). The TI item asks about experiences of the household instead of the respondent himself. In spite of these differences, the analysis of the relationship between the prevalence rates found in the ICVS and in the TI corruption barometer revealed a high degree of agreement. The two measures of victimization by petty corruption were found to be strongly correlated (r=0.75) (Van Dijk, 2008). On average, ICVS bribery prevalence rates are 9.9% higher than the Transparency International rates, as is to be expected considering the wider scope of the question used in the ICVS.

In order to increase the number of countries that could be included in analyses, we have integrated the two datasets with an adjustment of the TI data to better match ICVS data (TI scores were multiplied by 109.9%). Through this operation we were able to calculate corruption victimization rates for 92 countries for 2000-2002 (Van Dijk, 2008). The mean of the national prevalence rates of these countries was 16.4%. The results show huge regional variation in levels of street level corruption. Victimization by such corruption is almost unknown in Western Europe, North America and Oceania but quite common almost everywhere else.[5] The highest prevalence of bribe-seeking in the world was observed in Albania (59%). Of the European countries also Moldova (35.2%), Lithuania (22.9%), Belarus (20,6%) and Russia (16.6%) stood out. These excessively high rates can be seen as remnants

of the high level of corruption which is typical for transitional countries[6]. The extreme Albanian position must also be interpreted against the background of the massive 'pyramid scam' which bankrupted many Albanian citizens in 1996/97 and in which government officials were believed to be involved.

At the bottom end, Japan stands out with a rate of 0.1. Street level corruption seems to be a rarity in Japan. Among the fifteen countries with the lowest scores on corruption are grouped besides several Western countries, Botswana (0.8, Hong Kong (1.1%), Taiwan (1.1%) and Singapore (1.1%). The latter countries are all reputed for having made great efforts in curbing corruption through the establishment of well-functioning anti-corruption agencies. Their low scores on victimization by petty corruption demonstrate the success of their large scale and sustained counter-corruption campaigns. The position of these acclaimed corruption fighters at the bottom of the scale adds further credibility to victimisation-based measures of corruption.

Transparency International has since 2004 repeated its studies of bribery-victimisation as part of the Corruption Barometer annually among an expanding selection of countries (TI, 2010). The item on petty bribery that is used has in 2006 been adjusted. It now asks respondents about experiences with paying bribes to nine different types of public officials (which are read out during the interview). As a consequence, the prevalence rates have gone up, complicating comparisons with older results. In its latest report from 2010, TI reports that the mean prevalence of the 86 countries participating, was 25%. The global level of street level corruption was found to have gone up since 2006, especially in the cri,minologically important domains of the judiciary and the police. The results of the 2010 TI Barometer are consistent with those of the ICVS 2000-2002 reported above. Street level corruption is rare in Australia, North America and almost all Western European countries, with the exception of

[6] [6] In the questionnaire used in 2000 in Central-Eastern Europe respondents were also asked whether in their opinion it was likely that a given official of various state institutions would ask for a bribe or would expect to be bribed. The large majority confirmed that in their experience all types of officials mentioned would routinely accept bribes. Of the various categories nurses and doctors, police officers and custom officers were mentioned most often as ready receivers of bribes (Alvazzi del Frate and Van Kesteren, 2004).

Greece. Street level corruption is comparatively common in most developing countries and in all ex-communist countries, most notably those that have been part of the soviet union (e.g. Armenia, Lithuania, Moldowa. Russia and Ukrain), with the remarkable exception of Georgia. In Asia Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore have remained “islands of integrity” in a highly corrupt region.

Perception- based measures of corruption

Although TI has since 2004 repeated its survey-based Corruption Barometer, measuring actual experiences with petty corruption, its most widely publicised statistical indicator of corruption remains its Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) (Transparency International, 2010). The CPI is a composite index of the perceived extent of corrupt practices in countries, both grand and petty, drawing on over a dozen different surveys (Lambsdorff, 2000). In some earlier editions ICVS data have, as said, been incorporated as well. More recent versions of the CPI are largely based on results of surveys among business people and assessments made by risk analysts. The findings of the various surveys and risk analyses used show high correlations, which supports the construction of a composite index (Lamsdorff, 2005).

Although the CPI has had significant political impact as an awareness raising tool, used by the local chambers of the organisation, its methodology has attracted serious criticism. One common criticism is that the sources used differ significantly across countries and years. Conceptual clarity and comparability of results over time have sacrificed as a result. Another criticism is that perceptions of business leaders and experts influence each other and that high rankings could therefore be based on the mere 'echoing' of unfounded, media-led beliefs. Perhaps the most salient criticism is that the CPI as an index measuring perceptions of a wide range of broadly defined corruption problems cannot accurately reflect changes in the actual extent of specific forms of corrruption, bribe-seeking by customs officers or traffic police.

The rates of actual experiences with officials asking or expecting bribes according to the 2005 ICVS sweep were compared with the scores on the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency Internationa,l with low scores indicating high levels of perceived corruption (Transparency International, 2005). Figure 3 shows results. Rankings on the two indicators of corruption were strongly related to each other (r=0.72).

Figure 2: Plot of experiences with bribe-seeking by public officials (percentage prevalence rates and ratings on the TI Corruption Perception Index. Sources: 2004 – 2005 ICVS and Transparency International 2004.



The relatively high positions on the corruption prevalence rates of Greece, Hungary, Poland and Estonia are confirmed by similar high scores on the Corruption Perception Index. Italy shows somewhat worse scores on the CPI than it does on the ICVS-based victimization rate. Although the two measures are fairly strongly correlated, the correlation is far from perfect. Obviously, the two indicators measure different phenomena with the ICVS item measuring the actual prevalence of victimisation by a concrete form of low level corruption and the CPI measuring perceptions of the public or experts of the general prevalence of corrupt practices within all levels of government.

The question raises which of the two indicators can be seen as the most valid and reliable measure. This question has been addressed empirically by Coalition 2000, a consortium of NGO's campaigning against corruption in Bulgaria. Their research team has in the framework of an elaborate corruption monitoring mechanism carried out quarterly surveys among the Bulgarian public between 1998 and 2005, asking about both actual participation in corrupt transactions (whether respondents have payed bribes), and 'corruption pressure' (whether respondents have been asked to pay a bribe) as well as about perceptions of the extent of various types of corruption. The percentage of respondents admitting to have actually payed a bribe during the past month declined from 1% in early 1999 to 0.5% in November 2004. The quarterly rates show a clear downward trend over the years. The 'corruption pressure' indicator showed a similar downward trend (Coalition 2000 2005). Interestingly, the researchers did not register any changes in their index of perceived levels of corruption during the same period. Although actual levels of 'petty corruption' had gone down significantly, the scores on the perception- based items remained more or less constant during the reference period. Perception-based indicators showed fluctuations linked to recent media messages about corruption scandals and/ or anti-corruption initatives. According to the analysts, ICVS-type of questions about victimisation by bribe-seeking or corrruption pressure seem to reflect the actual movement in the level of corruption better than perception-based indicators of corruption.

Rose & Whisler (2010) examined the congruence between objective experiences with bribery and perceptions in Russia. Their primary conclusion is that negative perceptions of the corruptibility of state institutions is much more widespread than actual experiences. The gap between perception and experience is greatest for the police: whereas 89% regard most police as corrupt whereas only 5% report that anyone in their household had paid a bribe in the past 2 years. The study also demonstrated that at the individual level perceptions are little influenced by personal actual experiences. The correlations between perceptions and experiences were surprisingly weak (.09).

Although the case studies in Bulgaria and Russia confirm the methodological vulnerability of perception-based data, it would be wrong to dismiss T.I's CPI or similar perception-based aggregated indices of the World Bank as irrelevant. Surveys among the public on actual experiences with corruption may be the best option of measuring petty corruption but cannot measure forms of 'grand

corruption', involving high level public officials, politicians and connected businessmen, collaborating in the theft of state resources. Ordinary people are not personally confronted with such hidden practices. In this context, it should be reminded that the moderately high position of Italy and Spain on the ICVS-based scale of corruption probably underestimates the seriousness of corrupt practices in high circles in these countries. The ICVS indicator and similar Corruption Barometer measures do not capture less visible but potentially more damaging forms of grand corruption. For a proper understanding of the corruption problems of countries, ICVS-based results on corruption will in our view have to be supplemented with data from other sources, including perception indices.

Parallel to TI's Corruption Perception Index, the World Bank has initiated its own comprehensive indices of perceived corruption in the framework of its governance indicators programme. The Bank's composite index of Control of Corruption measures "perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of state institutions (Kaufmann, Kraay, Mastruzzi, 2003). One of the source variables is derived from the annual surveys among business executives of the World Economic Forum[7].

We have examined the intercorrelations between the TI Corruption Perception Index of 2010 and the World Bank Control of Corruption Index of 2008. As expected they were found to be very strongly correlated (r= . 89). The correlation between the ICVS-based bribery indicator of 2005 and the Control of Corruption index of 2008 was less strong (r= .50). In criminometirc analyses of the impact of corruption on criminal policies, it seems advisable to apply both types of measures.

Corruption as impediment of the fight against human trafficking

One of today's most important priorities in international criminal policy is the fight against human trafficking. Manifestations of the political will to address this form of transnational crime are the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 of the USA and the adoption and widespread ratification of several international legal instruments, including the UN Palermo Protocol of 2002 and the Council

[7] The WEF item on corruption asks business executives how common it is for firms in the country to pay undocumented irregular payments or bribes to various state institutions (WEF, 2011).

of Europe's Convention against Human Trafficking of 2005. The USA State Department issues Annual Reports of Trafficking in Persons, ranking countries with respect to their actions in fighting human trafficking (distinguishing between 4 different tiers). The American Congress has mandated the administration to impose sanctions on countries placed in the fourth tier. The Palermo protocol is not accompanied by a similar monitoring and sanctioning mechanism but has been followed up by several regional action plans, generously funded by a special gift from Bahrain. In spite of these efforts, implementation of the Palermo protocol leaves much to be desired (Van Dijk, 2011,b). The lack of real progress in the fight against trafficking has been exposed in reports from the Global Alliance against Trafficking in Women (www.gaatworg). A report of UNODC (2009) shows that significant numbers of convictions of traffickers have been obtained in just a small minority of, mainly Western, countries. Considering that human trafficking is generally considered to be the third largest category of organised crime following drugs and arms trading, the low numbers of convictions of traffickers are particularly striking. This lackluster result of punitive action against traffickers is confirmed by the first round of assessments of the Council of Europe's Group of Experts on Action against Human Trafficking (GRETA) (www. coe.int.dgh/monitoring/trafficking). In most member states of the Council of Europe whose anti-trafficking policies have so far been evaluated, not more than a handful of convictions have been secured. On the basis of quantitative indicators, a group of the University of Gottingen observed that anti-trafficking policies in most countries improved between 2000 and 2003 but stagnated thereafter. The ratification procedures regarding the Palermo Protocol seem to have stirred many countries into legislative action, without a follow up in investigative efforts and prosecution or prevention.

A possible explanation for the disappointing implementation of anti-trafficking legislation especially in the area of investigation and prosecution and migration control, is medium and high level corruption. Corrupt practices can interfere with government policies in multiple ways. In most cases ordinary citizens or business executives seek speedier or better treatment by officials by paying bribes ("greasing the wheels"). In the case of human trafficking the situation is more complicated. Bribes are given to consular staff, airline personnel and border control officers to smuggle trafficked persons across borders. In addition organised traffickers seek immunity from arrest, criminal prosecution or

sentencing through payments to law enforcement and criminal justice officials[8]. Although not all persons involved in human trafficking necessarily belong to mafia-type organised crime groups (UNODC, 2010) , criminal networks play a prominent role. In many countries key persons of such networks, are involved in illegal entertainment industries where trafficked persons are exploited (and sometimes recruited). 'Buying' protection from the State is a necessary condition for the sustainability of such organized crime activities.

In previous criminometric work we have analysed the statistical relationships between indicators of corruption and indicators of the prevalence of organised crime activity in countries (Van Dijk, 2007). In these analyses we have used a composite index of organised crime comprising of both objective and subjective indicators. One the components of the index was the rate of business executives who state that their companies incur serious costs from organised crime (World Economic Forum, 2004)[9]. The results showed that indicators of corruption such as the Word Bank indices of corrruption and the CPI were strongly correlated with the index of organised crime (Van Dijk, 2007). We have repeated these analyses using the most op to date versions of the CPI, the World Bank Control of Corruption Index and the WEF item on organised crime (OC). The correlations between the CPI and the WEF indicator of Organised Crime was moderately strong (r= .45). A similar correlation was found between the Control of Corruption index and Organised Crime (r=. -40). The results confirm the interconnectedness of high levels of corruption and organised crime activity. The links between corruption and human trafficking might in some countries be particularly entrenched because of the involvement of organised crime.

[8] It is often said, that successful prosecutions of traffickers are hampered by the lack of convincing testimony from victims. A promising strategy for traffickers seeking immunity from prosecution would seem to combine intimidation of victim-witnesses with bribe- giving to investigators and prosecutors.

[9] The WEF surveys ask about perceived costs to individual companies from victimisations by racketeering. This approach lies somewhere between questions about real victimisations by extortion etcetera such as done in business victimisation surveys (Van Dijk, Terlouw, 1996), and questions about general perceptions of mafia prevalence.

One of the leading experts on modern forms of slavery, Kevin Bales has, indeed, named rampant corruption in source countries as one of the driving forces behind human trafficking worldwide (Bales, 2005). In his informed view bad governance in source countries is a more important driver of human trafficking than extreme poverty. In a Background paper of UN Gift (UNGIFT, 2008), examples are given of criminal groups involved in human trafficking which have corrupted local institutions such as in Thailand and Cambodia. Also Italy and Lithuania are mentioned as countries where groups involved in trafficking in women and children for sexual exploitation exert strong influence on customs, police, border officials and criminal justice institutions. According to a report from the Program against Corruption and Organised Crime in South East Europe (PACO, 2000) almost all countries in the region suffer from rampant corruption problems directly linked to human trafficking. These corrupt acts are said to range *"from passivity (ignoring or tolerating) , or actively participating in or even organizing trafficking in human beings* (…)"[10].

The hypothesis of a link between human trafficking and corruption has been put to a criminometric test. In an explorative analysis of quantitative data Zhang & Pineda (2008) conducted a regression analysis of the TIP rankings by the State Department., using the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International as independent[11]. Their results showed that of all variables used, corruption ($r = -0.44$) and per capita income ($r = -0.41$) were the most correlated with the TIP ranking. In other words, the greater the transparency in government operations (less corruption) the

[10] In the GRETA report on Moldova, NGO's are quoted as saying that corruption among law enforcement officials acts as a major impediment of addressing recruitment of victims in their country.

[11] The CPI has been used in an analysis of the impact of police corruption on the readiness of victims to report crime victimization to the police .Soares (2005) has shown that high scores on the CPI are statistically significantly correlated with a reduced readiness among the public to report crime incidents to the police according to ICVS results. Where (perceived) corruption is more prevalent, fewer people report victimisations by ordinary crime to the police. Although Soares interprets this finding as evidence that the CPI reflects levels of actual corruption within police forces, the correlation might also be caused by the deterrent effect of ill-founded negative perceptions.

lower the rank in the TIP tier system (better implementation of anti trafficking policies and presumably less problems with human trafficking). Also the greater the per capita income, the lower the TIP rank. We have reexamined the links between corruption and the efficacy of anti-trafficking policies, using different types of measures of corruption as well as an alternative, more refined measure of anti-trafficking policies than the TIP ranking.

The ranking by the State Department of the USA of countries with respect to their compliance with anti-trafficking policies as defined by the USA has met with criticism. According to the General Accounting Office of the USA the rating procedures and kriteria used are unclear, making the final ratings vulnerable to subjectivity (United States, 2006). Another criticsm levelled at the TIP raking is that no distinction is made between the compliance in different policy domains such as prevention, prosecution and victim protection. Combining data from the TIP country reports and from two reports on human trafficking policies of UNODC (UNODC, 2009), Seo-Young Cho, Dreher & Neumayer (2011) have rated 177 countries with respect to their level of compliance with the Palermo Protocol. The rating was based on assessments by the researchers of compliance in the three main dimensions prosecution, protection and prevention. The authors constructed separate indices on the three policy dimensions and one over all aggregate anti-trafficking policy index over the 2000-2009 period (www.human-trafficking-research.org). Their over all index is called the 3P index. The disaggregation of anti-trafficking policies in the three components, prevention, prosecution and protection is pertinent for an analysis of the impact of corruption. Especially vulnerable to corruption would seem prosecution (efficacy of law enforcement and criminal justice) and prevention (border and immigration control). Protection of victims of trafficking would seem less vulnerable.

The main analytical interest of the authors was the possible interdependency between the anti-trafficking policies of various countries. One of their hypotheses was that main source countries might exert political pressure on source countries to adopt more effective policies. Building on unpublished explorative analyses of the TIP ratings by Bartolow (2010), the authors included in their econometric model control variables like GDP and democracy as well as the World Bank Control of Corruption Index. In their first preliminary analysis, the TIP ratings was used as dependent. Their results conform the earlier findings of Zhang and Pineda (2008) and Bartolow (2010) that the level of corruption as

measured by the World Bank is inversely related to the TIP ratings[12]. Seo-Young Cho, Dreher & Neumayer have repeated their analyses using their own, more finely grained anti- trafficking measures. The over all measure of anti-trafficking policies (3P index) was found to be unrelated to the World Bank's Control of Corruption index. Their results furthermore show that the over all quality of a country's prevention and protection policies improve with the perceived absence of corruption. But no significant relationship was found between the control of corruption index and the quality of prosecution policies.

These results partially confirm the relationship between measures of corruption and the ratings of anti-trafficking policies found by Zhang and Pineda (2008). Contrary to expectations, however, a high prevalence of corrruption seems to have little or no impact on prosecution, an area that seems especially vulnerable to the corrupting influence of organised trafficking in persons.

As said, the analysis of the Goettingen team was not focused on the relationship between corruption and anti-trafficking measures but on inter country transmission of policies. A corruption indicator was included as control variable in the model. We have repeated their analysis with a bivariate regression analysis of the four Goettingen indices of anti-trafficking policies and three different measures of corruption as independents (ICVS, CPI and the World Bank's Control of Corruption index). Results of the analyses with the three measures of corruption were fairly similar. The correlations between the 3P index and the ICVS variable was the weakest ($r = .09$; $p < 0.001$, $n=70$). The correlations with the two perception - based measures, CPI and World Bank CC respectively were somewhat stronger ($r = .19$; $p<0.000$; $n=162$ and $r = .20$, $p < 0.000$; $n=170$). We will depict here the main plot depicting the relationship between the World Bank's Control of Corruption Index and the Goettingen 3 P index. Figure 3 shows results.

[12] Bartolow (2010) used the CPI of Transparency International in his analysis and has thus replicated the analysis of Zhang and Pineda of the relationship between the CPI and the TIP ratings. Neither Bartolow nor the Goettingen team seem to have been aware of the publication of Zhang and Pineda (2008).

Figure 3 Scores on World Bank Control of Corruption Index 2008 and Goettingen Anti-Trafficking Overall Index 2009



13

[13] A multiple regression analysis with GDP as control variable confirmed a statistically significant relationship between Control of Corruption and the 3P index of human trafficking policies (beta= .27; p< 0.05).

Although the relationship is not very strong, the link between corruption and implementation failures in the fight against human trafficking is confirmed.

We have, finally looked at the correlations between the Worldbank Control of Corruption Index and the three constituent components of the Goettingen index regarding prevention, prosecution and protection. As in the econometric model of Seo-Young Cho, Dreher & Neumayer, the correlation with the constituent measure of prosecution is weaker (r= .10) than those with protection (r=.14) and prevention (r=.19). This finding flies refutes the expectation that trafficking groups seek immunity from law enforcement and prosecution through systemic corruption/ state capture.

Discussion

The starting point of this paper was the item on experiences with bribe seeking by public officials added to the core ICVS questionnaire for its second round in 1992. This item has been retained in subsequent ICVS rounds carried out in 1996, 2000, 2005 and 2010 and has also been incorporated in the EU Safety Survey scheduled for 2013. Transparency International has since 2004 also annually collected data on the public's experiences with street level bribery (actual payment of bribes). The phenomenon of street level corruption is most prevalent in developing countries and transitional countries in Europe, especially those that formed part of the former Soviet Union. In countries with reputed anti-corruption agencies such as Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore levels of petty corruption are comparatively low.

Next we have presented findings of secondary analyses of the ICVS- based indicator of corruption. The results show that country rates for corruption are only weakly related to victimisation by ordinary crime. They also show that the ICVS rates of actual experiences with bribe seeking are moderately strongly related to perception- based corruption measures such as the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International and the Control of Corruption Index of the World Bank Institute. Case studies in Bulgaria and Russia have demonstrated the tenuous relationships between perceptions of corruption prevalence and actual experiences with bribe-seeking. This negative result comes as no surprise to criminologists who have long been aware of the differences between subjective and

objective measures of common crime emanating from survey research. In fact, the criminological insight that experiences with crime must be distinguished from perceptuions of crime has induced the designers of the ICVS in 1992 to formulate a question on actual victimisation by bribe seeking rather than questions on perceptions.

Research into trends over time in practices of corruption at the level of individual public officers should preferably use victimisation-centred rather than perception- based data. The ICVS–type indicators can be used to examine the real movement of street level corruption including the real impact of anti-corrution drives. In addition these indicators allow an analysis of how actual experiences of corruption and crime impact on the trust in the police and other relevant institutions both at the level of individual respondents and at the country level.

In view of these findings, the new Corruption Barometer Surveys measuring both experiences and perceptions of corruption among samples of the general public, initiated by Transparency International in 2004, are to be welcomed. The results will, together with the results of future ICVS rounds, including the EU SASU, provide important data on real movemnets in street level corruption, supplementing the better known perception-based corruption indicators of international NGO's and International Organisations.

Having said this, we also want to stress the limitations of victimisation-centred measures as well. Especially damaging forms of high level corruption in government circles such as fraudulous privatisations or licensing schemes are unlikely to be captured with questions on experiences with everyday bribe seeking. By way of illustration we refer to the gap between modest levelsof street level corruption and high levels of grand corruption and maffia-style racketeering in Italy. Our reservations about victimisation-centred measures are confirmed by analyses of the relationships between measures of corruption and indicators of organised crime activity. As expected, stronger correlation were found between perception-based measures of corruption and organised crime indicators than between rates of victimisation by bribe seeking and such indicators. An additional advantage of the perception-based indicators is that they are available for more countries and over longer time spans.

Although country rankings in terms of crime and corruption tend to attract most attention from the media, the real test of the usefullness of such criminometrics is their use in analytical work. Topical

issues for the international criminal justice community are corruption among police officers, prosecutors and judges, and possibly related implementation failures in the fight against human trafficking. We have reviewed previous analytical work on the possible impeding impact of corrruption on the execution of global policies against human trafficking. In this context we have replicated earlier analyses using different measures of both corruption and anti-trafficking policies. In line with the results of Zhang & Pineda (2008) and Seo-Young Cho, Dreher & Neumayer (2011), we found statistically significant inverse correlations between the ICVS-based indicator of corruption and two perception –based corruption indicators of the World Bank and TI respectively, and two measures of implementation failure, the ratings in the Trafficking in Persons Reports by the US State Department and a composite index of compliance with international standards for anti-trafficking policies constructed by Seo-Young Cho, Dreher & Neumayer. The link between corruption and failures in the implementation of anti human traffkcing policies was confirmed by the results of these quantitative analyses. Surprisingly, though, the hypothesis that these relationships would be strongest for the dimension of prosecution policies was refuted. This curious result is in line with the outcomes of the econometric model used by Seo-Young Cho, Dreher & Neumayer.

The finding that the quality of the prosecution of traffickers is unrelated to measures of corruption challenges assumptions about the impact of a culture of corruption on the efficacy of investigation of trafficking cases and criminal proceedings against traffickers. This result sheds doubt on the hypothesis that in many countries sophisticated organised crime groups systematically corrupt public level officials such as prosecutors and judges. Alternatively, the negative findings are caused by flaws in the operationalisation of prosecution compliance. Although the scoring procedure used by the Goettingen team is superior to that of the State Department, the assessments is still largely based on subjective judgments. Possibly, the scoring method has not captured those aspects of prosecution that are most vulnerable for interference from corruption. One of the principal kriteria for the quality of prosecution was compliance of the national criminal code with the Palermo protocol. The substance of law- in- the- books, however, may have little bearing on the investigative and prosecutorial efforts and achievements. In this regard, it should be recalled that ratification of the protocol – and presumably prima facie compliance by adjusting domestic law- was most popular among some of the

countries with the worst track record according to the TIP reports (Van Dijk, 2008). Legislative compliance may have been used as an alibi by non-implementing countries. Questions can also be raised about the inclusion of sentence severity as a kriteria of compliance. Sentences tend to be more severe across the board in developing countries and ex-communist countries than among Western European countries (Van Dijk, 2008). It is doubtfull whether this can be seen as proof of better compliance with the Parlemo protocol. There are several reasons why countries with high levels of corruption may have received better scores on prosecution than they deserved, thereby blurring the relationship between corruption and anti-trafficking compliance[14].

It seems worthwhile to explore whether a measure can be constructed based not on subjective judgements of assessors but on statistics of numbers of victims registered and the numbers of arrests, prosecutions and convictions per country. These statistics could then be used to calculate objective performance indicators such as the ratio between total numbers of victims registered and numbers of arrests, prosecutions and the proportion of arrests resulting in convictions. When such hard measures of law enforcement and prosecution performance in the fight against human trafficking are available, they could be used in future criminometric tests of the corruption–anti- trafficking link.

[14] As can be seen in figure 3, some countries in the first quarter, possessing bad scores on corruption and good scores on the anti-trafficking index, include countries which are regarded as main source countries of trafficking flows into Western Europe such as Nigeria, Moldowa and Albania (UNODC, 2006).

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